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guide for those seeking perspective when dealing with the press-
ing problems of the day.
Walter A. Chudson*
REFLEXIONEN UBER SEIN UND WERDEN IN DER RECHTSGESCHICHTE, by
Ulrich von Li]btow. Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1954.
Pp. 61. DM.4.80.
There is agreement today among students of jurisprudence
and legal history that law, being part of the general civilization
of a people, is undergoing changes as this civilization develops
and that, consequently, the legal notions and institutions of any
given period or nation cannot be fully understood unless seen
in the light of their historical antecedents and growth. Compara-
tive legal history, on the other hand, has brought to light sur-
prising similarities as to the laws of peoples that have reached
comparable stages of social and economic development but other-
wise are not connected by either a common origin or mutual
cultural influences. These similarities are the greater the more
primitive the respective stage of general civilization is; but
while positive institutions and techniques may become increas-
ingly different as the law grows more sophisticated, there are
certain patterns of development which may differ from place to
place, as far as their relative importance is concerned, but still
can be observed over and over again and therefore appear to be
typical. The result of the interplay of all these factors is a cer-
tain tension between the conservative trends necessarily inherent
in all law and the forces pressing for new concepts and forma-
tions. The ultimate task of the legal historian, as it is conceived
today, consists in elucidating the part these elements play in the
evolution of the law and in discovering the religious, intellectual,
social, economic, and political conditions that bring the various
factors into action.
A number of problems involved in this situation, and espe-
cially as they apply to the history of Roman law, are the topics
discussed by the author (who holds the chair of Roman law in
the Free University of Berlin) in his little book of "reflexions
on the stationary and the evolutionary in legal history." In the
first chapter he dwells on the two possible attitudes of lawyers
* The author is a member of the United Nations Secretariat, but the
opinions expressed are personal and do not necessarily reflect those of the
Secretariat.
1955]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
toward their own law, i.e., the "dynamic" approach resulting in
constant adaptation through daily practice of the law to the
changing needs of society-the most conspicuous historical ex-
amples being the activities of the Roman praetor and of the
common law judges-and the "static" approach, sometimes detri-
mental to smooth and organic progress, which is found wherever
the law is fixed once and for all by statute or based on a system
of abstract concepts and axioms held to be absolute and immut-
able. This introductory analysis of attitudes is followed by a
survey of the part the idea of evolution has played in the science
of Roman law; here the role of the "Historical School" of Savigny
and his successors and particularly the impulses owing to
Rudolf von Jhering are duly emphasized. The third chapter
contributes a brief discussion of typical patterns of evolution:
basic legal forms and conceptions, while often endowed with
considerable endurance and thereby, among conservative peoples
like the Romans and the English, serving as a barrier against
inorganic breaks and jumps in legal development, are also the
starting points for innovations brought about by means of their
progressively becoming more abstract and differentiated and by
their being applied to practical purposes not originally envisaged.
Some ideas concerning the methods and aims of present-day
Roman law research are set forth in the final chapter.
All this is set before the reader with a considerable array
of references to literature, not only legal but also historical and
philosophical; in this respect it may be regretted that American
writings-especially the works of Holmes, Cardozo, and Roscoe
Pound, which contain much that would have suited the author's
purpose-apparently were not available to him. There is no
documentation from original sources but a great deal of exempli-
fication, taken, as was natural for the author, mostly from the
history of Roman law, but also from other laws, especially the
English. Still, the presentation would have gained if the author
had based it more strongly on truly comparative observation,
thus giving more emphasis to the universal importance of the
historical facts observed by him. There might also have been
more concentration on the theme indicated by the title and
perhaps a little less admixture of material the connection of
which with the author's chief concern cannot always be easily
discovered. One may, for instance, wonder if it was necessary
to call back, by branding them once more as the sheer nonsense
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they are, from their well-deserved oblivion some utterances on
Roman law by ignorant Nazi writers.
The author certainly does not fail to stress the conservative
trends that make for the continuity of legal systems by serving
as correctives to the progressive and evolutionary forces; he in
fact several times emphasizes the "polarity" which exists be-
tween the two tendencies. Nevertheless, this constant struggle
between what is and what tends to evolve-in Roman law, in
particular, the characteristic gap between a conservative cling-
ing to traditional patterns and new social or political functions of
the same old concepts and institutions-does not always emerge
as markedly as it should. This is perhaps due to the fact that
the author's description of the patterns of evolution is not ex-
haustive; for instance, he does not mention the role of fictions
and other procedural techniques employed in putting old notions
to new uses. From the point of view of general historical juris-
prudence, the reviewer would also have appreciated it if the
author had pointed out the different directions the evolution
of legal systems will take according to whether or not progress
is brought about by a class of trained specialists, and if so,
whether the chief medium of progress is the drafting of instru-
ments designed to give the proper legal form to new types of
business transactions (as was the case in Hellenistic times), the
decision of cases (as in Rome during the classical period and in
the common law countries), or legislation and theoretical reflec-
tion (as in the late Roman Empire or in modern continental
Europe).
In spite of these criticisms, however, the reviewer does not
hesitate to characterize the book as a meritorious effort to point
out certain aims, methods, and results of present-day research in
legal history and to illustrate the importance which the study of
Roman law, in particular, has in this connection. Its chief value
lies in familiarizing non-specialists with what is one of the prin-
cipal purposes of this science. It is believed that American
readers, too, will be interested in this book, precisely because
the study of Roman law, in spite of the fact that in classical
times it was astoundingly close in spirit and methods to English
law, is as yet not fully developed in the United States.
Hans Julius Wolff*
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